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Abstract:
As this article demonstrates, Vietnam stands out among the beneficiaries of
Japanese war reparations for the huge gap in expectations as to compensation is-
sues (although the Cambodia example offers a counterpoint)．Not only was the
Tokyo government challenged internationally by the Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam (DRV) as the sole legal claimant upon these funds, but domestically by the
major left-wing opposition parties (and where the major Japanese reparations-aid
project, a hydro dam, was crippled by the DRV's southern arm, the Viet Cong)．
But even prior to the French invention of the State of Vietnam in 1949，it was
France which made claims upon Japan for war damages and reparations, as well as
for unpaid loans and debts. A complex diplomatic contest that also engaged
Washington, not all issues were resolved even with France's recognition of Japan
as an independent state, and the emergence in 1955 of the independent Republic of
Vietnam under President Ngo Dinh Diem. Precisely, this article problematizes the
interwoven themes of French war damages claims, Vietnamese reparations, and
Japan's postwar business links．
Keywords: Japan; France; Vietnam; Cambodia; War damages claims, repara-
tions; business links
This article seeks to disentangle the complex claims and counterclaims to Japanese war
reparations deriving from the period of Japanese rule in Vietnam in the years 1940-45．It
demonstrates that, alongside Cambodia, Vietnam stands out among the beneficiaries of
Japanese war reparations for the huge gap in expectations over compensation issues. Not
only was the Tokyo government challenged internationally by the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRV) as the sole legal claimant upon these reparation funds against both the
Republic of Vietnam and France, it was also challenged domestically by Japan's major left-
wing opposition parties. The issues were complicated by the fact that the major Japanese
reparations-aid project, a hydro dam, was crippled by the DRV's southern arm, the Viet
２
Cong. But even prior to the French invention of the State of Vietnam in 1949，France made
claims upon Japan for war damages and reparations, as well as for unpaid loans and debts.
The multi-sided diplomatic contest also engaged Washington and not all issues were
resolved by the San Francisco Conference in 1951 or the emergence in 1955 of the indepen-
dent Republic of Vietnam. Although Emperor Bao Dai had been restored in 1949 by the
French as head of a partly autonomous Associated State of Vietnam, in backing the Republic
of Vietnam, the Americans turned to another figure who had served under the French,
namely Jean Baptiste Ngo Dinh Diem.
A staunch anti-communist Catholic ally, Diem would eclipse Bao Dai in a rigged election
in October 1955，becoming the President of the Republic of Vietnam until his assassination
at Washington's behest in 1963．With the emergence of the Republic of Vietnam, the Kin-
gdom of Cambodia, and the Kingdom of Laos as independent states following the Geneva
Conference settlement (1954)，the three countries virtually stepped into the shoes of
France in negotiating their future relations with Japan, war reparations included. Just as the
three Indochinese states established diplomatic relations with Japan on their own terms, en-
couraged by the United States with Cold War considerations to the fore, France looked to
the future in its relations with Japan, putting aside a host of acrimonious wartime claims and
recriminations. On the other hand, Japan sought to expand its political, economic, and com-
mercial links with the three Indochinese states, while also entering into a commercial
relationship with the DRV, under the formula of“separating politics from economics.”But
Tokyo neither recognized the DRV nor provided reparations. This article problematizes the
interwoven themes of French war damages claims, Vietnamese reparations demands, and
Japan's contested postwar political and business links with Vietnam in support of US goals.
Key elements of Japan's war reparations as well as ODA programs are relatively well un-
derstood (See Nestor 1992)．Indonesia, for example, is well represented with the study by
Nishihara Masashi (1976) on Tokyo-Jakarta relations between 1951-66．However, the liter-
ature on Indochina is more select or fragmented, as with Le Manh Hung (2004)，who has
examined Japan's“special Yen”demands, Masaya Shiraishi (1990) with a summary ac-
count of postwar reparations, and books focused upon Japan and the“Vietnam War,”as
with Thomas J. Havens' evocatively-titled Fire Across the Sea and, in French, the more
general work by Guy Faure and Laurent Schwab (2008).
Drawing upon a range of French (Minist re des Affaires Etrang res or MAE) and Aus-
tralian (National Archives of Australia or NAA) archival materials, this article takes the In-
dochina compensation case, Vietnam in particular, as a particularly problematical one,
where even the beneficiary of Japanese war reparations (the Republic of Vietnam) was
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challenged, not only by the DRV and its international backers but, domestically, by a stri-
dent and highly vocal anti-war movement. In short, it seeks to establish links between Fran-
ce's postwar compensation claims, US“reverse course”on compensations in line with ris-
ing Cold War perspectives, France's climbdown in its need for allies in the face of North
Vietnamese intransigence, and Japan's reparations-cum business negotiations with the
American-backed Republic of Vietnam. The article is divided into four sections. First, I will
discuss French war damage claims on Japan. Second, I will focus upon the San Francisco
Treaty of 1951 insofar as it affected relations with France and the Associated States of In-
dochina. Third, I will examine the diplomatic and trade relations between Japan and the In-
dochinese states. Fourth, I will discuss the background and actualization of Japan's repara-
tion agreement with, especially, Vietnam. I conclude by discussing the“Vietnam War”ef-
fect on the Japanese economy.
French War Claims
In early 1946，as France consolidated the restoration of its colonial order in Vietnam in
the wake of the Japanese surrender, a special commission was established to assess war
damages inflicted by Japan in Indochina. Known as the Commission Consultative des Dom-
mages et des Reparations. The Commission's interim report offered provisional estimates of
damages inflicted between 1940-45，as well as specifying damages of the Japanese occupa-
tion on both French and local Indochinese interests. It concluded，“Japan through its occu-
pation, through bombardments and conflict, contributed to the annihilation of the fruits of
50 years of labor.”While acknowledging that the conduct of the war in Indochina was not
exactly analogous to that of Germany vis- -vis France, it sought to apply the criterion for
war damages as determined by the Commission des Reparations (4March 1921) after World
War I in determining German war damages (anon, Evaluation des Dommages，1946).
The computations are complex but included claims for“spolations,”or pillage, destruc-
tion (inflicted upon French and Allied forces)，other damages (goods, persons and other
costs imposed by war operations)，damages to private property, and special charges. Nota-
bly, as the report emphasized, pillage by Japan in Indochina commenced even prior to the
declaration of a state of war. As the report pointed out, these were not only French losses, as
“the purchases conducted in Indochina by Japan were, in reality, supported by the In-
dochinese Union [the Indochinese countries].”In other words, there was a diminution of
economic patrimony“without real counterpart and to the single benefit of the occupier.”
Notably, Japan manipulated the rate of exchange to its benefit．As the report made clear,
４
extortion of piastre via the Yen“credits”system (as explained below) should be the central
feature of future reparation claims upon Japan (anon, Evaluation des Dommages，1946)．As
discussed below, compensation for the Yen credits would not only be vigorously prosecuted
by France, but also by Thailand and China which made parallel claims.
Otherwise, the French Reparation Commission report offers an itemized lists of damages
and claims upon Japan for compensation, as with, for example, railways, the French mer-
chant marine, French property in Indochina/China, and“damages to persons.”A parallel
reckoning itemizes claims (or special charges) associated with the Indochinese countries. In
summary, the total damages suffered by France and the Indochinese countries stemming
from the Japanese occupation were reckoned at 2,761million piasters at 1939 value, or 13,
800million piasters (1945 value)．Rounding to 14milliard Indochinese piastres, this amount
equaled 235milliard French francs, or the equivalent of 2milliard or US$ 2 billion dollars
(anon, Evaluation des Dommages，1946)．France would press its reparations claims to the
eve of the San Francisco Conference in early 1951，expressly demanding US$2 billion com-
pensation from Japan for wartime damages incurred in Indochina．As explained below,
however, not one centime would ever be paid to France.
The Far Eastern Commission
France's claims on Japan were not just a bilateral exercise but, as with other Allied coun-
tries, would fall under the ambit of a multilateral organization. The lead body concerned
with Japan's post war reparations, the Far Eastern Commission (FEC)，emerging out of
the Moscow Conference of December 1945，numbered the following member countries; the
USSR, the UK, the US, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
India, and the Philippines. With headquarters in Washington, the object of the FEC was to
formulate principles and manners to assure that Japan would meet its reparation obligations,
and to examine the demands of each member country. The FEC worked with the Allied
Council in Japan, SCAP, and its hierarchy. Consequently, the US played a determinant role
from the first meeting of the FEC held on 18 July 1946．Decisions taken at this meeting
related to the restitution of stolen property, namely machinery, gold, cultural objects, and
ships. France was represented by its Ambassador, P.E. Naggiar．(Nouvelles Documents, E-
tudes No.1，Comit  Interministerial de l'Indochine)．Undoubtedly, this meeting raised ex-
pectations of the potential recipient countries - France, China, the Philippines and Australia
－ as to future claims upon Japanese plant, machinery, and other industrial goods. Further
meetings of the FEC (14 August) also pronounced upon the“reduction of Japan's war
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potential.”In February 1947，discussions at the FEC on“advanced transfers of Japanese
reparations”had already crystallized. However, as the French member remonstrated, at
that stage, French Indochina and India had not been listed as recipient countries and, in
agreement with the Soviet member, urged inscription of all eligible countries in the ad-
vanced reparation transfer program (FEC，11 February 1947，“Advanced Transfer of
Japanese Reparations.”Note by the Secretary-General)．In June 1948，the FEC reached
substantial agreement on the level of industry needed to meet Japan's peaceful needs. But
the FEC process had already been stalled while awaiting a US statement.
No quick consensus was reached by the FEC as to the precise modalities of Japanese war
damage compensation, especially relating to the issue of shares among the would-be
recipients. From an early date, US representative Edwin Pauley had made it clear that the
US would receive reparations from Japan en nature rather than in cash (Times of India，
24 September 1945)．As explained by a US aide-memoire of 11May 1949，from the earliest
days of the occupation, the US was guided by a desire that victims of Japan's occupations
would receive Japan's capital resources as reparations without jeopardy to its ability to meet
its own“peaceful means.”Notably, on 1 April 1946，the US informed the FEC that desig-
nated quantities of facilities deemed superfluous for Japan's needs should be immediately
available for reparations. But the US also began to reevaluate its position on the question,
based upon a number of assumptions and (unstated) biases. In the new interpretation, the
US argued, Japan was facing demographic pressure which placed great strain upon existing
resources. Moreover, the US was carrying Japan's budget deficit．“Further reparations
from Japan would jeopardize the success of the Japanese stabilization program.”It was also
argued that Japan had already paid substantial reparations through the expropriation of its
former overseas assets (Korea; Taiwan;Manchuria)．Unilaterally, the US declared that it
had rescinded the directive of 4 April 1947“therefore bringing to an end the advanced trans-
fer program.”The US also withdrew its proposal of 6 November on Japanese reparations
shares (NAA A 461 H50/1/6: Reparations from Japan,”Embassy of the US, Aide-
Memoire, Canberra，11May 1949).
FEC member countries received the US aide-memoire with coolness (Australia)，bitter
opposition (the Philippines, as with the Romulo statement of 26May 1949); and with ou-
trage at its“illegal and immoral”stand (China)，which deemed the US position“incom-
patible with a series of international agreements”and“unjust to victims of Japanese ag-
gression”(NAA A 461 H50/1/6 cablegram, Australian Embassy, Washington，27May
1949).
The truth is, however, that“reverse course”was already in process. A creature of the
６
Cold War, Washington's reverse course on Japan was shorthand for the complex diplomatic
pact whereby Japan (and its war criminals) would be forgiven and even rehabilitated (even
alongside the major industrial conglomerates that fueled Japanese arms buildups)，in a
Faustian bargain that would reposition Japan as a US ally in the struggle against com-
munism. Facing the Chinese communist thrust, the Chinese Nationalists had grasped at the
same straw, as early as 1945 offering new life to Japanese war criminals with the requisite
military skills. As it became clear to France that the Viet Minh were“in bed”with the
Chinese communists, the French Fourth Republic (1946-58) would likewise begin to shift
towards signing a peace treaty with its former enemy.
French Claims on Indochina Special Yen
In general, all Japan's unpaid foreign loans, including the unpaid loan contracted by the
City of Tokyo in 1910 (France suspended all repayments on this loan in 1940)，were under
investigation by the FEC. But the major economic-financial issue besetting France and
Japan was the question of Special Credits including Special Yen. During the war years,
Japan had transferred large tranches of counterpart funds out of French Indochina offering
the counterpart of Special Yen parked in the Yokohama Specie Bank in Tokyo by the Ban-
que de l'Indochine. Such included“Yen rice”under which Japan plundered Indochina's
cereal resources (See Le Manh Hung 2004: 110-2)．The parallel, as far as French opinion
was concerned, was the“clearing system”imposed by Nazi Germany over occupied
France. As the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs signaled to their mission in Tokyo in
1953，they attached more weight to a resolution of the Special Yen issue than the reparation
and damages restitution issue. This was all the more so as the French had, by 1953-54，
failed to sign an interim agreement with Japan over damages which in any case were now
being taken up by the Vietnam-Japan negotiations in which France had a much reduced in-
fluence (MAE Asie Oc anie Japon 109).
From the outset, however, the French government and SCAP differed over this issue as
well. Notably, the“Special Yen”account had been opened in April 1943 in application of
the accords of 20 January 1943 (signed with the Laval Vichy government)，an arrangement
that saw the French Indochina administration via the Banque de l'Indochine and its branch
in Tokyo deposit both Yen, dollars, and gold with military-linked banking institutions in
Tokyo, notably the Yokohama Specie Bank right up until the end of the war. At war end, the
Banque de l'Indochine held with the Yokohama Specie Bank a Special Yen account of 848,
414,008.99．It also held a US dollar account of 2,035,674．67．With respect to the Bank of
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Tokyo，33,658,813.70 grammes of gold were earmarked, otherwise accruing from US pur-
chase of Indochina rubber (1941-42)(MAE Asie Oc anie Japon 109，R. Douleau, Conseiller
Commercial de France, Washington,  Ministre de Finance，15 Fev．1946).
To this day, Vietnam recalls in no uncertain terms the despicable drain upon the local
economy imposed by“fascist”Japan through its impositions upon“imperialist”France
(anon: History of the August Revolution，1979: 41)．However, given the role assigned for
France by the FEC process, Vietnam was never even vested with the right to reclaim these
monies obviously including interests of national patrimony.
But just as the French Fourth Republic moved to gain restitution of Special Yen accounts
lodged in Japanese banks in the early postwar period, so it came into conflict with a largely
disinterested SCAP bureaucracy in Tokyo. Notably, until suspended under French diplomat-
ic protest, SCAP immediately moved to dissolve the Yokohama Specie Bank. Neither was it
helpful to French interests that, on 27 December 1945，SCAP also commenced the liquida-
tion in Tokyo of the local branches of the Banque de l'Indochine along with the Banque
Franco-Japonais. The French were also vexed that General MacArthur himself would not
explain why he stonewalled on the Special Yen issue. More generally, the French sought to
decouple the Special Yen issue from the reparation question (MAE Asie Oc anie Japon
109).
The American attitude is revealed in the text of conversations between French Ambas-
sador in Tokyo, Zinovi Alekse evitch Pechkoff, and MacArthur and staff. Basically, SCAP/
Washington contended that the French treaties (with Japan) were signed by Vichy France
and were considered null and/or were of the nature of private transactions. The American
side also did not wish to privilege France over a host of other claimants (notably, China and
Thailand)(MAE Asie Oc anie Japon 109)．There was a certain disingenuous logic on the
part of the Americans, especially as Washington hosted a Vichy Embassy through at least
December 1942，and US-Vichy relations－ especially under President Roosevelt－ were on
a“day to day”basis. The Provisional Government of the French Republic, headed by
Charles de Gaulle, was only recognized by the US on 23 October 1944．The American posi-
tion offered ammunition to the Japanese side in future dealings with the French.
The French Climb Down and Diplomatic Push
French Foreign Affairs documents reveal that, from mid-1947，their officials in Tokyo
had entered into discussions with members of the Cercle d'Etudes Economiques Franco-
Japonais. Members included former Japanese ambassadors, Kurusu, Kuriyama and Yokoya-
８
ma Masayuki, the latter installed as Resident of Annam following the Japanese coup de force.
The three former wartime diplomats declaimed that Japan had“great responsibility”for
“troubles”in Indochina and wished to renew relations with Indochina. Yokoyama, espe-
cially, dwelt upon the considerable economic potential of Indochina and foresaw future
Japanese involvement (MAE Asie Oc anie Indochine 284 Delegation Franais des Repara-
tions et Restitutions, Tokyo，24 Juillet 1947).
The diplomatic recognition issue was taken up in earnest in Paris in early 1948．The argu-
ment in favor, as outlined in a brief position paper, acknowledged that, in the coming years,
Japan would emerge as“the pivot around which Far Eastern political and economic issues
would revolve.”Japan was a looming exporter of industrial material to the Far East and
would comprise a market for Indochinese rice, coal, minerals, phosphate, salt, wood, etc.
The paper predicted that Japan would take its place within the Pacific economic system and,
given instability in China and the Philippines, Indochina would look to Japan to support its
industrialization. As recommended, it was in French interest to establish political contacts
between Indochina and Japan. And, to this end, it was imperative to place an“autonomous”
Indochina representative in Japan, first with SCAP, and then with the Japanese government.
The suggestion was for a French official answering to the so-named French High Commis-
sioner in Saigon. The possibility of a Vietnamese representation abroad was then regarded
as“one of the most delicate issues”in Franco-Vietnamese relations (MAE Asie Oc anie In-
dochine 284“Note sur la Representation de l'Indochine au Japon,”Paris，18 Janvier 1948)．
In any case, it would take a major international conference to break the logjam on the resto-
ration of diplomatic relations between France and Japan outside of SCAP control.
Still, France was obliged to work through SCAP. Although Vichy France had maintained
an accredited Embassy in Tokyo and consulate in Yokohama through the war years (at least
until March 1945)，technically the first official postwar contact between Japan and France
outside of SCAP auspices, took place at San Francisco in 1951．While the Conference out-
come would see the restoration of full diplomatic relations between Paris and Tokyo, France
also repeated its claims at San Francisco for US$2 billion in compensation from Japan.
France and the San Francisco Peace Treaty of September 1951
Some background is necessary. Following a visit to Paris in early June 1951 by John
Foster Dulles, serving as special envoy of US President Truman, the broad outlines of
French conditions for its participation in the proposed peace treaty with Japan were clari-
fied, just as US expectations were made known. The basic French demands were made clear
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to Dulles in a meeting with the French President Vincent Auriol. Dulles went out of his way
to mollify France as to any revival of Japanese“political imperialism.”Tellingly, he point-
ed out, Japan would“integrate”its forces with those of the US. He also made it clear that a
treaty with Japan would not prejudice any future (French) negotiations with Germany.
Auriol, on his part, sounded out Dulles' view on the participation of the Associated States
(Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) in the San Francisco treaty negotiations. Dulles saw no ob-
jection, but preferred the formula of bilateral relations between the Associated States and
Japan. Auriol demurred, offering two outcomes, one in which the Associated States gave
mandate to France to sign in their name, or the other in which the Associated States and the
French Republic separately sign with Japan (at San Francisco)．These views were echoed
by Alexandre Parodi, secretary general of the French foreign ministry in conversations with
Dulles and in subsequent press releases (MAE Asie Oc anie Japon 52，Audience de M.
Foster Dulles par M. Auriol).
As Dana Adams Smith summed up the conversations in the New York Times (12 June
1951)，where Dulles wished a“treaty of reconciliation,”Parodi wished for reparations.
Specifically, France demanded US$ 2,000,000,000 reparations from Japan including repay-
ment of three pre-war loans; compensation for the destruction of French property including
plant; compensation for French shipping, along with rubber, cotton and other goods seized
by Japan. Moreover, to win US consent, France had backed down on its earlier proposals
that both China and the USSR participate at San Francisco.
The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed by 48 Allied nations and Japan in San Francisco
on 8 September 1951 and coming six years after Japan's surrender, facilitated Japan's return
to the international community. Under Article 11 of the Treaty, Japan was obliged to accept
the judgments made by the International Military Trial of the Far East (IMTFE)，as well
as judgments made by other Allied War Crimes courts outside of Japan. But China, the Sov-
iet Union, India, Burma and Korea were not signatories to the Treaty and the DRV was not
invited. Thanks to French patronage, however, among the signatories were the Bao Dai
government, as well as the Cambodian and Lao governments. With the Treaty coming into
force on 28 April 1952，Japan then entered into diplomatic relations with the Bao Dai and, in
turn, the Diem governments. The Bao Dai government ratified the San Francisco Treaty on
8May 1952．On 10 January 1953，the three governments notified the Japanese government
that they agreed to open diplomatic relations. However, as discussed below, the successors
to the Bao Dai government postponed the actual opening of a legation until after the conclu-
sion of a reparations agreement in May 1959.
More broadly, under the terms of the San Francisco Treaty (14th article)，Japan was ob-
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liged to meet the reparations demands of former occupied nations. Accordingly, Japan
signed a series of reparation agreements (baisho) with Burma (November 1954); the Philip-
pines (May 1956); Indonesia (January 1958); and, eventually, South Vietnam in May 1959．
Cambodia and Laos, as explained, would abandon the right to receive reparations, although
in October and March 1959，Japan agreed to provide them with economic and technical
aid.1 Japan did not pay reparations to Thailand, but agreed to make a payment for the liqui-
dation of Special Yen (agreement of July 1955，revised January 1962)．As Nestor (1992:
121-2) contextualizes, by tying all this aid to purchases of Japanese goods and services，
“Tokyo opened up vast export markets as each country became dependent on Japanese
corporations for spare parts, related products and technical assistance.”Moreover, in line
with Cold War logic, Washington used every possible means to promote Japan's economic
penetration. South Vietnam was in the front line.
Japan and the Associated States
Not only did France support the participation of the former Associated States in the San
Francisco process, it took for granted that they would individually enter into diplomatic rela-
tions with Japan“at an opportune time”(MAE Asie Oc anie Japon 15，file 060 Tel, Paris,
Etassocies，16 Sept 1952，no.910/911 to Minetassocies, Saigon)．In November 1952，Gai-
musho made it known to France that it wished to establish diplomatic relations with the As-
sociated States. The priority was Saigon followed by Phnom Penh, and Vientiane. With
these states represented at San Francisco, the Quai d'Orsay did not feel it prudent to oppose
this plan. In fact, it was Cambodia which, in a note of 26May 1952，first approached Japan
(prior to the Japanese request) to establish diplomatic relations. In October, Vietnam solicit-
ed and obtained French government approval to establish relations with Japan. Even so,
Vietnam dragged its feet. Its president Nguyen Van Tam had revealed a repugnance at mov-
ing any time soon on the matter, and gave the appearance of linking it with the reparation
question. Jean Letourneau, Minister for Overseas France, believed it both in the interest of
France and Vietnam to move ahead．(MAE Asie Oc anie Japon 15 Note for the Secr taire
g n ral，24 Nov 1952，#073).
In January 1953，as Gaimusho signaled, Cambodia sought the establishment of relations
at an early date. Vietnam had also expressed in-principle agreement. Laos was also in agree-
１ Joined by two Thai banks, the Bank of Tokyo also opened a branch in Vientiane, Laos (report of 27 Sep-
tember 1956)，an odd choice given the dearth of commerce in Laos aside from gold trafficking, the drugs
business, and other activities on the back of the French-American aid programs in that country.
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ment but wished the future Japanese embassy in Saigon to be accredited to King Sisavang
Vong and had no immediate intention to establish an embassy in Tokyo (MAE Asie Oc anie
#78 Japon 95)．Irritated at the inconclusiveness of the Vietnamese side, Gaimusho stepped
up its pressure on France to intervene and France appears to have brokered the agreement
on diplomatic relations between the two countries. France also helped to broker the estab-
lishment of a Cambodian mission in Tokyo (MAE Asie Oc anie #78 Japon 95 t l. Paris，
13 Avril 1953)．
Even so, as reported, the Vietnamese government would not entertain the establishment
of diplomatic relations until negotiations on the reparation question were underway (MAE
Asie Oc anie Japon 109，MOFA t l．30 Juillet 1955 to Bangkok #093)．On 22 September
1954，as the French side learned, a Japanese Diet delegation visiting Saigon was received
correctly but“sans chaleur”(without warmth)．Finally, on 17 June 1963，as the Viet-
namese Foreign Ministry informed Paris, it had agreed with a Japanese approach to open
diplomatic missions in each other's countries, without subordinating the issue to the repara-
tions question. In turn, this d marche was passed on by the French authorities to Gaimusho
on 28 June (MAE Asie Oc anie Japon 109，Etat du Vietnam, MOFA no.1787-DAP, Saigon，
17 Juin 1954，“Note”#104).
The Debt Issue Revived
Still, the debt issue dragged on. In a Note Verbale of 8 December 1954 delivered to Gai-
musho, France called attention to the two outstanding cr ances (claims/debts)．The first
was for Yen 1,315,275,813.03 and the other was for US$ 479,631.19“possessed by the
French government with the liquidation of the Yokohama Specie Bank.”France wished a
speedy resolution of the problem and informed Tokyo in less than diplomatic language that
the problem was harmful to the creation of sound“economic relations between the two
countries.”France proposed negotiations (MAE Asie Oc anie Japon 109)．In other words,
it was sticking to its claims for damages incurred between 1940 and 1945.
But the Japanese side would have none of this, having made its position crystal clear at the
fifth session of the Japanese-Vietnamese negotiations relating to ship salvaging and repara-
tions held on 7 July 1953．At that forum, the French representative asserted that he consi-
dered 8 December 1941，the day that the London-based French National Committee (under
Charles de Gaulle) declared war on Japan, as the day that a state of war existed between
France and Japan. The Japanese delegate retorted that all operations effected by the 8 De-
cember proclamation were without legal foundation and, moreover, under [Chapter V
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“Claims and Property”] article 14b of the Treaty of San Francisco, France had renounced
its right of reclamation of damages resulting from the war. If France wished, Japan would
explain its case in Tokyo (MAE Asia Oc anie Japon 109，M. Morand, Conseiller Commer-
cial, Ambassade de France au Japon to Ministre de Finance, Paris，17Mars 1955，“Recou-
vert de la cr ance de Tr sor franais sur le Yokohama Bank”)．This was basically correct.
Echoing American reservations over the FEC process, Article 14 stated, inter alia, that
Japan lacked the resources to make complete reparation, therefore (14b)“Except as other-
wise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the
Allied Powers.”Analogous arguments were presented to the visiting Thai foreign minister
in Tokyo in March 1953，namely that Japanese-Thai accord had been mutually dissolved,
and that no force had been exercised in the wartime pact, only moral suasion.
Another outstanding issue was compensation for the near total damage suffered by the
French Embassy in Azabu along with the Ambassador's residence destroyed by two Ameri-
can bombing raids over Tokyo on 23 and 25May 1945．On 9 July-10 August 1946，the
French mission in Tokyo filed claims with SCAP for Japanese (not American) compensa-
tion for the costs of reconstructing the Embassy premises. As SCAP replied on 15 October
1946，it would not press the issue. But, it also advised，“make the cost a matter of record
for future settlement.”Accordingly, on 8 February 1952，and citing protocols prescribed at
the San Francisco conference (Article 15 appears to fit)，France pressed the Tokyo govern-
ment to offer Yen 40million compensation to facilitate the reconstruction of the Embassy
(MAE Asie 1946-1955 Japan I)．There is no record that France ever gained this compensa-
tion.
As an internal French memorandum of 17March 1955 revealed, the claims issue was
going nowhere. In the interim, no doubt mindful of US reservations, the French decided to
cut their losses and reduce or restrict their claims to debts owed by Japan stemming from its
Special Yen manipulation between 30 August 1940 to 9 December 1941，that is, prior to the
declaration of war pronounced by the Free French under General de Gaulle (MAE Asie
Oc anie Japon 109，MOFA to Ambassador，8 Dec 1954 Tokyo)．Notably, on 30 August
1940，France had agreed under duress to facilitate the stationing of Japanese troops in In-
dochina and to offer credits to cover their expenses. In other words, France now backed
away from claiming debts accrued during the period of state of war (or the long three-year
period of Vichy-Japanese military cohabitation in Indochina)．In other words, France now
backed down from the lion's share of massive claims. It did not make this position public but
was prepared to abandon its blanket claims in the course of negotiations．
This was obviously a major climbdown but it also reflected the changing sovereignty
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stakes inside Indochina, arising out of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and France's inser-
tion in the Western Alliance. It was, moreover, the legal foundation upon which the French
Fourth Republic would effectively rebuild its postwar diplomatic relations with Japan. From
the present-day perspective of high tourism, cultural platitudes, and some genuine mutual
admiration, it is as if practically no-one on either side actually recalls these rather sorry e-
vents.
Japan-Republic of Vietnam Economic Relations
The evolution of post-war relations between Japan and the State of Vietnam (1949-55)
and, in turn, the Republic of Vietnam (1955-75)might be described as tentative, belated,
and strained. Reaching back to July-August 1954，the Japanese ambassador in Bangkok,
Ohta Ichiro, reportedly visited Saigon in connection with preparations for an exchange of
ministers between Japan and Vietnam. Australian officials learned from a Kyodo News
Agency correspondent in Saigon that the ambassador believed that Japan should observe the
(Geneva Accords) truce and the communists from close quarters. He also apparently be-
lieved that, if a general election was held, this would result in a victory for the communists
(NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I Japan-Economic Relations with Vietnam, P. Hill．3rd secreta-
ry, Australian Embassy in Japan，5 August 1954，Japan: Relations with Vietnam).
On 22 June 1954 or shortly after the Geneva Agreements, the Japanese Foreign Ministry
finally received Vietnamese written consent to exchange ministers and, as mentioned below,
the first Japanese minister (to the Bao Dai government)，Konagaya Akira, was appointed
in February 1955．In March 1955，Nguyen Ngu Thu became the first Vietnamese minister
appointed to Tokyo. In a short time, the legations were raised to embassy status. At the
same time, following US lead, Japan's diplomacy completely neglected the DRV (Shiraishi
1990: 5)
In reporting the meeting in Saigon of a Japanese economic delegation with the Union Syn-
dicales des Commercants et Industriels Vietnamiens at the Chamber of Commerce, the semi-
official Vietnam-Presse (15 September 1955) noted an increasingly strong economic current
between Vietnam and Japan over previous years. Notably, consignments of Japanese goods
were now entering the Vietnam marketplace. The report also signaled that, from early 1955，
Japan was actively preparing to sign a commercial treaty with“free Vietnam”designed to
replace the pre-independence agreement concluded by the French government still in force.
As the Australian Legation in Saigon reported in early 1956，there were rumors of the en-
try into Vietnam (with US approval) of Japanese experts in fisheries and engineering.
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However, President Diem had apparently changed his mind out of irritation that the
Japanese ambassador did not call upon him prior to return to Tokyo for consultations. As the
Australian report continued, Diem was also inconsistent insofar as he had already granted
permission to a Japanese engineering company to survey for a large hydroelectricity scheme
and had, accordingly, been granted a contract (NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part 1，Japan-Eco-
nomic Relations with Vietnam, Australian Legation, Saigon，28 January 1956)．A refer-
ence to the future Na Dhim dam project, as mentioned below, it would also come to the cen-
ter of Diem's future reparation negotiations with the Tokyo government.
The Contrast With Cambodia
On 26May 1952 (Note 1184-DPG)，Cambodia under King Sihanouk ratified the Treaty
of Peace with Japan (the San Francisco Treaty)．In acknowledging this ratification, on
4 July 1952 Gaimusho responded in a note to the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that
it wished to open full diplomatic, commercial, and trade relations (MAE Asie Oc anie,
Japon 95，Gaimusho, Tokyo，4 Juillet 1952)．On 25 August 1953，Gaimusho made it
known that its new embassy in Phnom Penh would be headed by Ambassador Araki Tokizo
as charg  d'affaires. Paris clarified that Cambodia would be represented in Tokyo by the
French Embassy (MAE Asie Oc anie, Japon 95).
Writing in the Asahi newspaper of 4 October 1954，under the headline“Cambodia is
Japonophile,”author Ishizaki observed that, not only did goodwill exist in Cambodia
towards Japan, but that it was“one of the few countries in Southeast Asia where hatred
towards Japan was not displayed.”Citing charg  d'affaires Yoshioka, Ishizaki declared
that, from the king and ministers down, all displayed affection towards Japan. He attributed
this benign state of affairs to the work of the Suzuki brothers (Shigenari and Shigemichi)
who had taken up residence in Cambodia in 1944 as head of the Japanese cultural mission,
one a Keio University graduate, another an ex-Paris trained artist. As an example of Cam-
bodia's links with Japan, Ishizaki observed, the king (Sihanouk) had secured airplanes from
Japan and sought engineering assistance to construct a port at Ream (in the Gulf of Siam) to
lessen dependence upon Vietnam. He also noted that Japan had contracted 120,000 tonnes
of maize the previous year (MAE Asie Oc anie, Japon 95).
As French officials well understood, Japan had gone out of its way to cultivate special
links with Cambodia in general and King Sihanouk in particular. Notably, Sihanouk made a
first visit to Japan in 1952，followed by a second in 1953，becoming the first Asian head of
state in the postwar period to receive an audience with the emperor. It was also noteworthy
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that Prince Norodom Kantal was nominated to head the first Cambodian mission in Tokyo
(MAE Asie Oc anie, Japon 95 Levi, Ambassador de France  MOFA, Paris，14 Jan 1955).
The Japanese press also privileged links with Cambodia, as with the Yomiuri (15 January
1954) article“Cambodia: A gold-mine to exploit,”authored by“old Indochina hand,”M.
Matsushita, and vice president of the Japan-Cambodia Friendship Society. According to the
article, in highlighting a visit to Cambodia by a Japanese delegation, Sihanouk declaimed
that，“Japan was the object of his love”and, accordingly, it was in this spirit that Cambodia
had renounced Japan's reparation obligations. Noting that trade only reached 10million dol-
lars annually, the article predicted that the advent of a commercial treaty would see business
surpass that figure (MAE Asie Oc anie, Japon 95).
The Uemura Mission to Cambodia
Visiting Japan in January 1955，a South Vietnamese economic delegation consulted with
business groups, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) officials, about the possibility of concluding a trade agreement be-
tween Japan and Vietnam. Meanwhile, a Japanese economic delegation headed by the vice
president of Keidandren (and future president) Uemura Kogoro visited Cambodia. Also
representing coal mining interests, Uemura was president of the Cambodia-Japan Friend-
ship Society formed in Tokyo in September 1954．This was a high power mission joined by
representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MITI, Forestry, Transportation, the Ex-
port-Import Bank as well as Mitsubishi Mining Company. As Australian officials interpret-
ed, the Uemura mission sought prospects for joint enterprises to develop natural resources
in Cambodia, while looking ahead to offering technical assistance (NAA A1838 759/3/
2 Part I Japan-Economic Relations with Vietnam, P. Hill. Australian Embassy, Tokyo，
27 January 1955，Japan: Economic Relations with Indochina).2
Upon his return to Tokyo from Phnom Penh on 8 February 1955，Uemura claimed that
Cambodia had accepted aid from Japan under the auspices of the Colombo Plan, notably in
irrigation works and agriculture. Joint exploitation projects were envisaged, especially in
light industry as, for example, a bicycle tire factory using local rubber. Scholarships for
Cambodian students in Japan were also under consideration (MAE Asie Oc anie, Japon 95，
Ambassade Levi  MOFA，11 Fev 1955，143-44).
２ Citing Gaimusho, a Far Eastern Economic Review report of 4 February 1965，announced that Japan had
also completed payments of Yen 1,000 million (some US$ 2,780,000) to Laos as economic assistance
(presumably in lieu of reparations).
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The Sihanouk Visit to Tokyo of January 1955
Sihanouk visited Tokyo again between 4-10 January 1955，leading to the signing of a
Traiti  d'Amiti ．Noting that Cambodia was one country occupied by Japan“ni cicatrice ni
rancune” (without scars or bitterness)，Sihanouk was locally feted as the first Asian head
of state to enter into commercial relations with Japan sans arri re pens e (with no
hesitation)．As French Ambassador to Japan Levi observed, Sihanouk's visit was also full
of symbolism, as with his renunciation of reparations and the act of remitting to the
Japanese Red Cross 1,000 Sterling that Cambodia had received as indemnity for prisoners of
war (In turn, the Japanese Red Cross proposed to use this amount to send medical supplies
to Cambodia)．Among those attending an officialized reception for Sihanouk in Tokyo were
General Managi, former Japanese Imperial Army commander in Cambodia at the time of the
March 1945 coup de force, along with a Colonel Ogiwara, presented as having saved the Prin-
ce's life at the time of the return of French forces to Phnom Penh (although we have no
record of that)．Also attending was a Captain Tadakuma, recently returned to Japan from
Cambodia, having served as instructor of young Cambodian nationalists (this rings true)．
Yet another was a Professor Kodaka who had“taken over”headship of the prestigious
Ecole Franaise d'Extr me-Orient in Cambodia, and author of a 4,000-page history of Cam-
bodia“redressing the errors of the colonialists,”while underscoring the parallels between
Japanese and Cambodian culture. In his speeches, Sihanouk had, variously, reiterated his
support for neutrality in foreign policy, rejected membership of SEATO, upheld the five
principles of coexistence, and declared adherence to the principle of Asian solidarity (Ibid).
Duly signed on 9 December 1955 by Sihanouk (since March 1955 abdicating in favor of his
father and assuming the title of prime minister) and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu
Mamoru, the Trait  d'Amiti  negotiations between Japan and Cambodia also involved dis-
cussion on the following salient points. First, the Prince envisaged a riel support plan to
offset Cambodian imports from France. Second, he unveiled a plan for Japanese emigration
to Cambodia. This was to be of the Brazil-type, following the precedent adopted by the Latin
American country towards Japanese immigration, notably suggesting a total assimilation．
[However, as the French understood, this plan depended upon considerable financial sup-
port from the Japanese government, hardly likely with costs estimated at 700,000 yen for
moving a family]．Summing up the import of the Sihanouk visit and the signing of a Treaty
of Friendship, the French ambassador observed that, if the propositions were well received
in Japan, however ambitious, the trip also showed Sihanouk's determination to cut an in-
dependent course (MAE Asie Oc anie, Levi  MOFA，13 Dec 1955; #172-5).
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To be sure, the French could not have been exactly happy to observe the King-turned-
Prince-politician cohabiting with a real“rogues' gallery”of old wartime Indochina hands
during his Tokyo visits but, whatever else might be read into Sihanouk's flirtation with early
postwar Japan, it is palpable that he was setting down a future independent course in Cam-
bodia's foreign policy that would see him align with most of America's past, present, and fu-
ture enemies. Meantime, he could play off French aid with Japanese.
Background to the Vietnam Reparations Agreements of 13May
1959
As Shiraishi (1990: 14) interprets, and as will be embellished below, Japan's eagerness to
fall in line with San Francisco was not so much out of moral angst but as a device to expand
Japan's economic influence over the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia and, at the
same time, restore Japan's domestic economy. But as with the Philippines and Indonesia
along with the South Vietnamese, Shiraishi continues, Japan could not restore those eco-
nomic links with Southeast Asia until it fulfilled its reparation obligations. In other words,
reparations became at the hands of the Southeast Asian elites, a precondition for Japan's fu-
ture activities in Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asian nations also wanted capital goods to
expand their own economies rather than imported consumer goods. Hence, reparations
spread out over years, were not paid in cash or capital goods but rather in Japanese products
and services, alongside loans, in other words tied aid. As understood, Japanese reparations
“paved the way for future economic penetration into the recipient countries.”Products
and services provided as reparations stimulated demand for more goods from Japan. In this
argument, reparations paved the entry of Japanese business into Southeast Asia while trad-
ing companies were able to revitalize their commercial activities to a far greater extent than
in the prewar setting. As discussed below, although the Japan-Vietnam reparations agree-
ment was signed on 15May 1959 coming in effect on 12 June 1959，its passage was deeply
troubled.
The Konagaya Conversation
As a first step on the way to signing a reparations agreement, an interim agreement con-
cerning reparations was initiated in September 1953 (Shiraishi 1990: 5)．This is revealed in
conversations between Japanese ambassador Konagaya Akira and the Australian Legation
in Saigon of 15 February 1957．Appointed in February 1955，Konagaya became the first
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minister appointed to the Republic of Vietnam. Another wartime Vietnam hand, Konagaya
had been Consul General in Annam at the time of the coup de force. Evidently, talks on repa-
rations began four years earlier in Tokyo with the French Embassy assisted by a Viet-
namese representative. The interim agreement was concluded with the signing of an agree-
ment under which Japan would contribute US$ 2,500,000 to effect salvaging of 70 Japanese
ships sunk during the war, mainly in the Vung Tau-Saigon area. The scrap from the ships
would be handed over to Vietnam (NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I Japan-Economic Relations
with Vietnam, Blakeney，“Japanese Reparations,”reported conversation with Japanese
ambassador Konagoya, Australian Legation, Saigon，16 Feb．1957).
However, with the advent of the Republic of Vietnam, the Ngo Dinh Diem government
refused to sign the agreement and opened up discussions with the Japanese Embassy in Sai-
gon, claiming a figure US$ 250million in reparations money. The Japanese considered this
“fantastically excessive and absolutely unjustified.”As related by Ambassador Konagaya
to F.J. Blakeney, an Australian Legation official, Japan claimed that its army had not en-
gaged in fighting in Vietnam and very little damage was incurred. Accordingly, only
Japanese damage could be taken into account. However, as the Diem government reportedly
countered, Vietnam should be compensated for the losses suffered on account of the war af-
fecting production generally, including industrial, mineral, etc. But the major part of the
Vietnamese claim was that, at the end of the war, the Japanese army sequestered enormous
quantities of rice from the north and south, with the apparent intention of building up large
stocks in the mountains to enable it to continue fighting whether or not the Emperor surren-
dered, and that this requisitioning led to disastrous famine in the north and the death of
some one million Vietnamese. In reply, Konagaya asserted that, apart from the figure of one
million, Vietnam had not provided statistics to support its claims for these immense repara-
tions, and“that, in fact, no statistics exist” (Ibid, and See Gunn 2011).
Following 18months negotiations in Saigon between Ambassador Konagaya and Foreign
Minister Vu Man Mau, the Vietnamese claim was reduced (late December-early January)
from US$ 250 million to US$ 200million. This was still considered too high for Tokyo (ap-
parently Japan started the negotiations with a figure of US$ 8million, later raised to US$
50million)．Meantime, as the Australian Legation commented upon this reported conversa-
tion，“the reparation agreements question is bedeviling Vietnam-Japan relations.”It also
blocked trade negotiations (Ibid).
Blakeney also signaled President Ngo Dinh Diem's thoroughgoing dislike and distrust of
Japan. As he reported, Diem was unwilling to agree to a procedure under which, once an
overall figure had been settled, Japan would pay in a variety of goods (both consumer and
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capital)．Reportedly, Diem argued that small projects and special payments continued over
an extended period of time was“a classic method of capturing the Vietnamese market.”
Instead, he insisted that Japan pay for a few major projects, namely building one of the dams
in the southern plateau (Ibid.)．This is actually an important revelation and we are left
wondering whether Diem was following his head or his American advisers (as discussed be-
low)．While Diem's confrontation with the Japanese over the reparations questions rev-
ealed real agency on his part, his willingness to rubber stamp big projects actually fell in
nicely with Japan's preferences and the generalized pattern of Japan's big ODA infrastruc-
ture projects, which continue in Vietnam unto this day.
The Diem Conversation
According to an Australian Embassy memorandum, while President Diem thought that a
settlement in the near future was on the cards, his suspicion of Japan for“'sharp practices”
in all commercial and economic dealings remained acute. As the report continued，“It will
take more than the settlement of the reparations issue to remove his general suspicions and
doubts of the Japanese” (NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I, Japan-Economic Relations with Viet-
nam, F.J. Blakeney, Memo No．1003 Australian Legation, Saigon，6 Dec．1957).
According to Blakeney, in a reported conversation with Diem on 29 November 1957，the
President outlined the earlier course of Vietnam's reparation negotiations with Japan. Fol-
lowing the signature of the Franco-Japan reparations agreement of early 1957，Japan had
taken the attitude that any Vietnamese reparation claims against Japan should henceforth be
made to France (from whom Vietnam should get its share) and that Vietnam could bring a
case against France in the International Court. The President's own reactions had been
sharp and final. He told the Japanese that their attitude was“insulting”and that, if this atti-
tude persisted, Vietnam would cut off all commerce with Japan. Subsequently, Japan real-
ized that this was no empty threat and that, unlike the governments of most, if not all other
Asian countries, the government of Vietnam had the effective capacity to restrict such com-
merce. In fact, commerce with Japan was currently running at only a few million dollars a
year (Ibid.).
The Kishi-Diem Communique
Seeking to up the ante on a speedy resolution of the reparations issue, on 19-21 November
1957 Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke visited Vietnam on a state visit, issuing a joint commu-
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nique with President Diem which does not appear to have been made public. However, as
the usually astute Bernard Fall (1958: 571) reflected upon the Kishi visit, for the Japanese,
the Vietnamese demands were in the realm of fantasy while, on the Vietnamese side, Japan
represented the sole means of procuring capital outside of the US and France. In the event,
neither Diem nor Kishi changed their negotiating positions. Kishi himself had been Minister
of Commerce and Industry from 1941 under General Tojo Hideki to Japan's surrender in
1945．Until 1948，he had been imprisoned as a“Class A”war crime suspect, albeit never
indicted or tried by the IMTFE. Kishi also had overseen the reparations settlement with In-
donesia under Sukarno between 1951 and 1958 (Nishihara 1976).
Upon Prime Minister Kishi's arrival in Saigon, President Diem informed him that Viet-
nam wished to have good relations with Japan, the more so since the two countries shared A-
sian cultures. He had put the case that it was in Japan's own interests to settle the repara-
tions problem with Vietnam as soon as possible since, until this was done, there could be no
normal commercial relations between the two countries, that this was at odds with Japan's
own interests, and that in the space of a few years of normal commercial relations, Japan
could expect to gain in terms of trade much more than the amount of reparations being
sought (F.J. Blakeney memo op,cit).
As Diem reportedly explained to Kishi, Vietnam was not asking for“war reparations”
properly so-called, but compensation for“paiements de bouche,”or rice eaten by the
Japanese during the occupation of his country, as well as for forcing the French to print
something like one milliard piaster of paper money to meet occupation costs, thereby deval-
uing the currency. If Japan did not pay the whole sum, currently claimed, he argued, then it
should pay a portion. According to Blakeney，“In answer to my query, the President con-
firmed that the figure the Japanese were now considering was something in the region of US
$ 85 million. Asked whether this was in cash or services or a combination of both, he replied
that Vietnam has signaled several large projects such as Da Nhim. I gathered that [Special
Envoy] Uemura's negotiations here later this month will be concerned with this figure”
(Ibid).
The Wolf Ladejinsky Conversation: Diem's Attitude towards
Japan
According to an Australian Legation report, Diem's opinionated American adviser, the
Ukranian-born Wolf Ladejinsky, who had earlier played a major role in land reform in Japan
under SCAP, quoted the President as saying that the Japanese are a nation without spiritual
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values, and that we cannot trust them. He also attributed the triumph of communism in Chi-
na to Japan's pre-war record in China. He did not think that defeat had changed Japan's
ways or that Japan had given up on its“co-prosperity sphere.”Reportedly, he stated that,
the 20 Japanese technicians who sought admission to Vietnam equaled 20 Japanese spies.
Diem apparently favored Western advisers (NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I, Japan-Economic
Relations with Vietnam, Australian Legation, Saigon, savingsgram，1 Oct．1956)．
America's lead man on land reform under Diem, Ladejinsky's thoughts on communism are
of all the more interest, especially as his career barely survived a McCarthyist era probe just
prior to his Vietnam appointment (1955-61).
Ladejinsky also prepared a paper for Diem on reparation negotiations. Having examined
Japanese (reparation) agreements concluded with Burma and Thailand, he acknowledged
that both negotiated from weakness, having had large rice surpluses to dispose of for urgent-
ly needed Japanese goods. Ladejinsky thus advised Diem that Vietnam's bargaining position
was stronger. Unlike Burma, Vietnam had large US financial and economic aid to bolster the
economy. He also showed how the Thai were“miserably tricked”by the Japanese through
out-and-out misrepresentation. He was also of the opinion that the Japanese had not suc-
ceeded in being accepted as trustworthy and their vanity in this regard should be played
upon as much as their claims for expanded trade relations (NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I,
Japan-Economic Relations with Vietnam, G.J. Price, secretary, Australian Legation, Sai-
gon，30 Aug．1956)．Diem would be less receptive to American advice in pushing through
land reform and, of course, would demonstrate himself as intractable to American interests
in general (See Fitzgerald 1972: 120-1).
In any case, Ladejinsky urged caution in dealing with Japan, citing the experience two
years prior of Prince Wan Waithayakonn, Thai Foreign Minister from 1952-57，who had
“burned his fingers badly”in accepting and signing an agreement with the Japanese con-
taining“a cleverly veiled clause which radically altered the nature of the agreement.”Bur-
ma, he explained, had a somewhat similar experience (NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I, Japan-
Economic Relations with Vietnam, F.J. Blakeney, Minister, Australian Legation, Saigon,
Memo no．10003，Saigon，6 Dec．1957).
The following year (February 1958)，Diem reportedly told Blakeney that it seemed that
the Japanese were having second thoughts over figures they had earlier agreed upon (about
40million dollars in material with expectations of additional sums of about 20-30million in
credits)．He saw no sign of early agreements (NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I, Japan-Economic
Relations with Vietnam, cablegram, Dept External Affairs to Australian Embassy, Washin-
gton，“South Vietnam-Japanese Reparations”).
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The Japanese Embassy in Saigon: The Ambassador Kubota Conversation
According to incoming Japanese Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, Kubota
Kanichiro, who arrived in Saigon on 26 July 1958，an agreement with the Republic of Viet-
nam would be considered as covering the whole country and no negotiations would be need-
ed with the communist regime in Hanoi. In conversations with Australian diplomats, he
referred to Japan's purchases of coal from North Vietnam as indispensable trade for both
partners．“I want to stress that trade and politics are two different subjects,”he asserted．
“The commercial relationship between Japan and North Vietnam has no political implica-
tions. Japan can carry on trade with any country regardless of ideological concepts” (NAA
A1838 759/3/2 Part I, Japan-Economic Relations with Vietnam“Reparation Agreement
with Vietnam,”To Dept of External Affairs, Canberra from Canada Delegation ICSC, Sai-
gon Japanese Reparations，31 July 1958)．We shall return to the separation of politics and
economics theme below. Sometimes described as a“tactless nationalist,”Kubota had a
background in colonial Korea and Manchuria. He is better known for his statement of Oc-
tober 1953 during high-level talks between Korea and Japan (“not everything that Japan
did in Korea was wrong”)，setting back normalization talks by four and a half years (Roz-
man 2011: 104)．As mentioned below, Kubota would also be a co-signatory of the Repara-
tions Treaty signed in Saigon on 13May 1959.
The Japanese Socialist Party Reaction
Japan's body politic of the time was riven between alliance supporters (the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) and the political opposition, including the Japanese Socialist Party
(JSP)，the Japanese Communist Party (JCP)，and large sections of civil society, from un-
ions and students, to a largely critical mass media. There was also of course a spectrum of
positions on the various issues involved, from the validity of the US-Japan Security Treaty,
the role of US bases in Japan, to anti-war opposition, to support to North Vietnam and the
reparation question. Even so as, Faure and Schwab (2008: 39) point out, both the left and
right in Japan strongly objected to offering compensation to Vietnam on the grounds that
very little war damage had been sustained in that country. If so, then it would be even more
reason for indignation upon the part of the French (who gave up the demand for practical
reasons) and even more so for Diem who could hardly risk losing the moral high ground on
the reparations issue to his communist adversaries in the North.
Pending ratification by the Diet, the JSP vigorously opposed the reparation deal. As the
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JSP argued, first, that Japan had already made substantial indemnity payments to France on
behalf of the Associated States of Indochina (Yen 1,650,000,000 plus 33 tonnes of gold in-
gots according to an undated Mainichi source); second, in the background of the reparation
talks stood Nippon Koei KK and other business groups connected with Uemura Kogoro;
third, Vietnam was divided and, if later unified, Japan might be obliged to pay North Viet-
nam; fourth, the north suffered more war damage than the south; fifth, Laos and Cambodia
waived reparation payments, so it is would be unjust to give payment to Vietnam; and sixth,
the North Vietnamese may retaliate by suspending trade relations and they are the more
reliable trade partner (NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I, Japan-Economic Relations with Viet-
nam“Reparation Agreement with Vietnam,”Keith Brenner, councilor, Australian Em-
bassy, Tokyo，14May 1959，File 6/2/3/6/1memo 450，14May 1959)．All of these were
cogent arguments against rewarding Diem alone, but we have no other evidence of gold and
other transfers from Japan to France.
According to Corcoran (a US source)，the Japanese Government had made it known
that, because of JCP opposition in the Diet to the conclusion of a Reparations Agreement
with Vietnam, the government felt it inopportune at the present (to push the settlement)
(NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I, Japan-Economic Relations with Vietnam, Australian Em-
bassy, Washington，24Mar．1958)．As Shiraishi (1990: 18) clarifies, notwithstanding the
opposition, the majority LDP under Prime Minister Kishi decided to discontinue delibera-
tions in the Committee on Foreign Affairs and forced through a vote in the general assembly
of the House of Representatives at dawn on 27 November 1959，while opposition parties
refused to attend. In so ratifying the reparations agreement with Vietnam, Kishi ignored
both international and domestic opinion.
As reported in Saigon-Moi (New Saigon) of 3 December 1959，“The Viet Cong put up an
anti-reparation demonstration in Hanoi but, on the very same day, the Lower House of the
Japanese Diet ratified the reparations Treaty.”On 26-27 November 1959，after an all night
session, the Diet Lower House approved the Japan-Vietnam reparations agreement
(198 votes in favor versus 131 against)．(NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I, Japan-Economic Re-
lations with Vietnam“Reparation Agreement with Viet Nam”).
Role of Associations and Lobbies
The role of associations and lobbies can never be underestimated in discussions on
postwar Japanese business links associated with reparation agreements with former occu-
pied countries. The role of the“Jakarta lobby”in facilitating Kishi's reparations settlement
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with Indonesia is better studied (Nishihara 1976)，but the Japan-Vietnam Friendship Socie-
ty merits attention. Inaugurated with a ceremony held at the Tokyo Gas Company Hall at
Nihonbashi, those present included Tsukamoto Tsuyoshi, former Japanese minister in In-
dochina. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru, whose wartime role is well documented,
made a congratulatory speech (NAA A1838 3014/11/89 Part I Vietnam Foreign Policy Re-
lations with Japan).
As announced, Japan would subsequently send a delegate to Vietnam led by special envoy
Uemura Kogoro to resume negotiations on reparations to seek an early settlement. But, ac-
cording to a press report, the pro-Hanoi Japan-Vietnam Trade Association urged Japan to
suspend negotiations with South Vietnam until south and north Vietnam became united (As-
sociated Press，9 October 1958)．The French Embassy also reported that the DRV com-
municated via its Trade Association that it would suspend the opening of credits for
Japanese imports if Japan continued its negotiations. The Australian Legation wondered
whether this was a propaganda gesture (NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I Japan-Economic Rela-
tions with Vietnam，“Japanese Reparations,”Blakeney, Saigon Legation, File 221/5/
5 13 Oct．1958)．The Japanese public hardly engaged the reparation issue at this juncture,
especially given the semi-secret nature of discussions involving privileged tiers of the busi-
ness, government and bureaucratic world. As mentioned below, it would be the American
use of Okinawa bases for bombing of Hanoi that would eventually lead to a rare polarization
between state and civil society over all questions touching upon Vietnam.
The Reparations Agreement of 13May 1959
Signed on 13May 1959，the war reparations agreement came into effect on 12 June 1960，
in line with the Japan-South Vietnam Agreement of January 1960．Of the Southeast Asian
countries occupied by Japan, Vietnam was the last recipient of reparations. As the Times
newspaper of London (13May 1959) summarized, negotiations had been delayed for years
owing to the“peculiar”international status of Vietnam. When Japan ratified the San Fran-
cisco Treaty with Vietnam, the country was under Bao Dai. However, in 1954，as a result of
the Geneva Agreements, Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th parallel, and Japan became one
of the last countries to recognize Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam) as an independent state.
The JSP argued that the reparations deal would violate the Geneva Accords. The same argu-
ment was used by the DRV which threatened to suspend exports of anthracite coal to Japan.
Negotiations resumed in 1957 with the Uemura mission to Saigon. These negotiations broke
down over the amount of compensation and Japan's demand for a most favored nation
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clause. The agreement, as signed, thus represented a compromise. The amount was about
half that demanded by Vietnam, while Japan waived its claim to most favored nation status
(tacitly admitting the special economic status of France and the United States).
In attendance, at the signing ceremony in Saigon on 13May were Vo Man Mau, the Viet-
namese Minister of Foreign Affairs along with the Vietnamese ambassador to Japan, Kubota
Kanichiro, and secretary general of the Ministry. On the Japanese side, the reparations
agreement was signed by Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aichiro, Kubota Kanichiro, Ambas-
sador to the Republic of Vietnam, and Uemura Kogoro (Counselor of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs) Japanese plenipotentiary (and a leader of Keidanren (Federation of Economic
Organizations) who had pushed the Da Nhim project)．President Diem received the
Japanese Foreign Minister. As the Australian Embassy interpreted, for the Vietnamese, the
signing of the agreements represented Japanese recognition of the Republic of Viet Nam as
the legitimate government for the whole of Vietnam. This was deemed a“brilliant diplomat-
ic success”for South Vietnam on the part of Foreign Minister Vo Van Mau) (NAA A
1838 759/3/2 Part I, Japan-Economic Relations with Vietnam“Reparation Agreement with
Vietnam,”Australian Embassy, Saigon，18May 1959).
The agreement provided for the payment of reparations amounting to US$ 39,000,
000 over a period of five years, payable in three annual installments of US$ 10,000,000，and
two of US$ 4,500,000．As prescribed, payments were in the form of goods and services re-
quired by Vietnam, to be used for carrying out projects outlined in the annexes to the agree-
ment. The principal projects upon which the reparations payments were to be expended in-
cluded the construction of a dam in the Da Nhim Valley (US$ 37,000,000)，and the setting
up of an industrial center (US$ 2,000,000)．Also described as a water conservation project,
the Da Nhim Valley hydropower plant located 20miles east of Dalat, was expected to pro-
vide a general capacity of 450,000 kw (NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I, Japan-Economic Rela-
tions with Vietnam“Reparation Agreement with Vietnam,”Keith Brenner, councilor, Aus-
tralian Embassy, Tokyo，14May 1959 Reparation Agreement with Viet Nam, File 6/2/3/6/
1 memo 450，14May 1959)．In an exchange of notes between the two sides (Saigon，
13May 1958)，it was also specified that all services supplied would be by Japanese nation-
als or groups. This was a propitious start to what would emerge as a prestigious project, one
that still plays a part in hydraulic control of the Da Nhim Valley.3
３ According to a hydropower industry website, the Da Nhim-1 dam is currently operated by Power Compa-
ny 2．Originally in operation between 1963-6 (as stated)，in June 2003，Toshiba and Nisho Iwai won a Yen
5 billion contract to rehabilitate the power plant, the 230KV transmission lines to Saigon, and the Saigon sub-
station. Funding is from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation.
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The reparation agreement was accompanied by agreements providing for two Japanese
loans to Vietnam, and a joint communique foreshadowing the early conclusion of a treaty of
commerce and navigation (See Japan Times，13May 1959)．Of the two loan agreements,
one for US$ 7,500,000 was to be made by the Japan Export Import Bank over a period of
three years. The credits were intended to meet the cost of providing materials required in
the initial stages of the Da Nhim Valley power station project. In the first year, US$ 2,500,
000 would be payable, the balance determined by the two governments. The second was a
commercial loan of US$ 9,100,000mostly allocated to finance a urea plant. However, the
amount of reparations and economic assistance to be expended by Japan (US$ 55.6million)
had been settled in May 1958．The main obstacles to progress had been the Japanese re-
quest for an undertaking by Vietnam to give Japan most favored nation treatment. But hav-
ing backed down, Japan then conceded to Vietnam that it was a matter to be dealt with in a
treaty of commerce and navigation. As the Australian report interpreted, this was a victory
for Vietnam because Japan could no longer link the issue with reparations as a lever
(“Reparation Agreement with Vietnam,”op.cit.)．Implementation of a second loan ($9.
1million)，however, was delayed and finally canceled (Shiraishi 1990: 19).
The fourth country with which Japan had concluded reparation and economic cooperation
agreements (fulfilling obligations imposed under Article 14 of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty)，following Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, Japan also signed economic and
technical cooperation agreements with Laos and Cambodia, both of which waived reparation
claims against Japan. The agreement signed with Laos in October 1958 called for granting
economic and technical assistance amounting to US$ 2.8million over a 2-year period. The
agreement with Cambodia signed in March 1959 called for assistance amounting to US$ 4.
2million, spread over three years (“Reparation Agreement with Vietnam,”op.cit.).
Continuing Japanese Aid to South Vietnam
Japanese aid to South Vietnam also received a push from Washington, which directly re-
quested such economic support as it looked to shoring up the Southeast Asian“dominoes.”
On 12May 1964，Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi announced in the Diet that, in response
to a request of 27 April by US Secretary of State Dean Rusk via a personal letter to Prime
Minister Ikeda Hayato, Japan would provide help of a non-military kind to South Vietnam.
As the Rusk letter stressed, Japan, with other non-communist countries, should cooperate in
helping South Vietnamese to resist communist insurgency. As the Australian Embassy ob-
served, press comments on Ohira's statements were“consistently cynical, if not hostile.”
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The JSP also attacked the government's policy．“Why should the Japanese, they ask, res-
cue the Americas from the impossible situation into which they have got themselves, and
what recognizable impact will Japanese aid have on South Vietnam?” (NAA A1838 759/3/
2 Part I, Japan-Economic Relations with Vietnam, P.F. Peters (1st Sec.)，“Japanese Aid to
South Vietnam, Australian Embassy，15May 1964).
Taking office in November 1964，Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, not only continued the sei-
kei bunri policy of his predecessors, but also played the Okinawa reversion card. Even so, as
Havens (1987: 23) wrote in his major study of these years, in exchange for American flex-
ibility over Okinawa (and China)，“Sato now seemed to be marching jowl to jowl with
[President] Johnson on the war.”It could have been, as Havens suggests, that Sato backed
the war without much enthusiasm in the interests of“trade and autonomy,”but it is also
true that his attempts at arranging a settlement (missions to Saigon) were largely derided
by the opposition as a sop to domestic politics. Despite his“hesitation,”Japan was never-
theless drawn by degrees into more active support as the war widened (Havens 1987: 27).
As Faure and Schwab (2008: 43-7) note, just as revelations emerged in early 1965 that
US bases on Okinawa were being used to mount bombing missions over Vietnam, public in-
dignation rose in Japan. Notably, the mass civil society anti-war movement, Beheiren (Be-
tonamu ni Heiwa o Shimin Rengo) or Citizen's League for Peace in Vietnam was launched
from a coalition of several hundred anti-Vietnam war groups (See Havens 1987: 54-76)．
Unquestionably the leftist dimensions of this civil unrest shook the business and political e-
lite to its foundations. Emblematic of the polarization besetting Japanese society in these
years was not only the rise of Beheiren and the Zenkyoto radical student movement on
university campuses (Nichidai)，but the reaction from the political and financial establish-
ment. Gerald Curtis (1975) is one who doubted the omnipotence of the zaikai in political cir-
cles in those years. He notes, however, that“vulgar”accounts (his language) highlight the
existence of various kai or groups linking such top business and political leaders, as with
Keidanren president Uemura Kogoro (sometimes referred to as the“prime minister of zai-
kai”)，and former prime ministers Tanaka Kakuei, Fukuda Takeo, and Nakasone Yasu-
hiro.
It must have galled American officials that“not a single major daily supported the bomb-
ing strategy.”Faure and Schwab (2008: 43-7) nevertheless point out that“Japan's contri-
bution to America's war effort was not inconsiderable.”Among other areas of solidarity
and active support, US bases in Japan were used for training marines headed to Vietnam,
Japanese sailors were embedded on US ships, senior Japan Self Defense Force (SDF) per-
sonnel were dispatched as observers to Vietnam and, for the first time, the war was the oc-
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casion of the first joint US-SDF military exercises. More than that, the“Vietnam War”
provided the backdrop to Japan's postwar rearmament.
Completion of Reparations Payments
Finally, in January 1965，in line with the Japan-South Vietnam Agreement of January
1960 under which Japan agreed to complete the war indemnification project over five years,
the Japanese government announced the completion of its war reparations payments to
South Vietnam, totaling US$ 39,000,000．Some 90 percent of reparations of US$ 35 million
were used for the construction of the Da Nhim River project, completed on 15 January 1964．
The other 10 percent was used for the construction of a cardboard plant, a ship salvage
works, a diesel engine plant, a plywood mill, and an iron foundry (UPI, Tokyo，13 January
1965).
Altogether, some 500 Japanese technicians had been engaged in the Da Nhim project, in-
cluding the erection of transmission lines from Thu Duc Bien Hoa, a project financed by a
Japanese loan of US$ 7.5million. Under the Colombo Plan of 1954，Japan supplied experts
and training at a cost of US$ 600,000 (half of which was diverted to training 200 Vietnamese
in Japan)．Engineering aid given since 1964 amounting to US$ 1,700,000 included 25 am-
bulances, medicines and medical equipment，20,000 transistor radios, blankets and con-
struction materials. Japan supplied medical staff at the Saigon and Cho Ray hospitals, was
then constructing the My Thuan bridge on the Mekong River near Vinh Long, and had un-
dertaken a major irrigation project in Ninh Thuch province (US$ 9.1million)．(NAA A
1838 3014/11/89 Part 2 Vietnam Foreign Relations with Japan Part II，“Viet Nam: Japan-
Australia Consultations Draft memo, Australian Embassy, Tokyo，12 Jan．1967).
In this period, according to an Australian Embassy report, Japan maintained a“relatively
large and active embassy in Saigon”where there was a small Japanese community dating
back to 1940-45．However, in a passing allusion to the contradictory nature of foreign aid in
the form of loans, the Australian Embassy reported that the cost of servicing Japanese loans
to South Vietnam (almost US$ 1 million in 1965) was more than South Vietnam received in
grant aid (US$ 316,000 in 1965) (NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I, Japan-Economic Relations
with Vietnam, Japanese Interest in Vietnam, Australian Embassy，27 Dec．1968).
Doubtless Japanese loans were also tied to the procurement of Japanese goods and serv-
ices along with commodities. By this stage, as mentioned below, Japan had become an in-
creasingly important source for the procurement of military supplies for Vietnam and, other-
wise, Japan had given useful public support to the Allied position in Vietnam. Space
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precludes an analysis of the kind of capitalist market economy that the Saigon regime was
then building in the Mekong delta in what can only be described as a war for control over
rice with the burgeoning Viet Cong (See, for example, Selden 1971)．While Ladejinsky and
his fellows in USAID were aware of the plight of landless peasants in the countryside, Diem
was recalcitrant in propping up the big landlords, many removed to the cities and even Paris.
Assassinated on 2 November 1963 in the throes of a CIA-backed military coup d' tat, Diem
would not live to see the opening of the Da Nhim dam two months later. Nevertheless,
Washington, and Tokyo did not slacken their support for the military junta which took pow-
er in South Vietnam.
However, disaster also struck Da Nhim in 1967．Three years after completion, the Da
Nhim hydro plant was badly damaged by the Viet Cong, whose attacks on electric transmis-
sion equipment had become frequent since May 1965，just as Diem had early carried the
war against the communist enemy to the Mekong Delta with wasting assaults upon the
religious sects. In 1969，Japan pledged another US$3 million to rehabilitate one of the
damaged penstocks and with an additional US$ 3 million pledged for the construction of a
transmission line to Saigon the following year. Total rehabilitation cost was US$ 10million
(NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I, Japan-Economic Relations with Vietnam, Japanese Interest in
Vietnam Australian Embassy，27 Dec．1968).
North Vietnam-Japan
According to a Hanoi report of 10May 1959，the Vietnamese foreign ministry declared
null and void any agreement signed between the Kishi Government and the Diem authorities
on Japanese reparations to Vietnam. As stated, the Japanese government had to bear full
responsibility for the consequences of the decision“running counter to international law,”
and the DRV“reserved the right to demand war reparations for Vietnam from the Japanese
government.”The statement noted that the agreement was strongly opposed by many
Japanese political parties, the JCP, the JSP, along with many progressive personalities．
“This is an unfriendly action towards the DRV, it damages the interests of both the
Japanese and Vietnamese people.”As the statement added，“the payment of war indemna-
tion (sic) to the SV authorities would only benefit the Japanese monopoly capitalists and
serve the scheme of the imperialists to sabotage the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam”
(NAA A1838 3014/11/89 Part II, Foreign Affairs, Canberra，10 June 1959，“Vietnam's
non-recognition of Kishi-Ngo Dinh Diem agreement”).
As reported in the Japanese media, in April 1959，a 5-member North Vietnamese eco-
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nomic mission arrived in Tokyo on a two-day visit to inspect industry and to attend the Osa-
ka trade fair. The first meeting in Japan by the delegation was with two private trade promo-
tion organizations. As the Australian Embassy understood, trade relations between the two
countries in 1959 totaled 4million pounds Sterling (about one third greater than in 1958)．
The trade, though small in absolute terms, was deemed an important part of North Viet-
nam's limited commercial contacts with Western countries. It mostly took the form of ex-
ports of coal and the import of metal products, textiles, and chemical fertilizer (NAA A
1838 759/3/2 Part I, Japan-Economic Relations with Vietnam“North Vietnam: Economic
Relations with North Vietnam, F 759/3/North Vietnam).
Japan's primary commercial interest with North Vietnam was in importing coal mined at
Hong Gai, resuming a trade that had commenced during French colonial rule. Japan's trade
with North Vietnam was only one-quarter of that transacted with South Vietnam. Moreover,
Japan's trade with the North came under further pressure from 1965 after the US objected to
Japan's exports of copper cable and other items deemed to be of strategic use in North Viet-
nam's war efforts. From 1965，private exchanges between Japan and North Vietnam were
channeled through the Japan-Vietnam Trade Association (Nichietsu Boekikai)．As with the
policy of“separation of politics and economics” (seiki buri)，according to Faure and
Schwab (2008: 39)，Japan was successful in working through a contradiction between its
political and economic interests.
Japan and the“Vietnam War”
As Masaya Shiraishi (1990: 22-5) has shown, changing political and economic circum-
stances in Indochina“significantly assisted the Japanese.”Notably, in the first half of the
1950s, the French purchased Japanese industrial products for the economic recovery of In-
dochina. Japan received a total of $12.3million from French special procurements between
1953-55 with almost all of this spent for Indochina. Between 1954-55，as the Americans
stepped into the French shoes, the US started allocating large amounts of International
Cooperation Agency (ICA) funds to Indochina and Japan became the biggest beneficiary of
this with more than 90 percent of Japan's exports to Vietnam from 1956-58 financed by ICA
funds. And with the increase of US aid to Indochina, Japan vastly expanded her exports to
that region. When the US switched to a“buy American”policy, Japan's ICA-based trade
withered and Japanese exports to South Vietnam significantly decreased in 1958，although
the trend reversed again in succeeding years. But from 1963-1965，Japanese exports finally
waned. Although Japan still kept up war reparations in 1963-64，the amount was greatly
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reduced. The 1966-75 period, as summarized below, reveals that again Japan rode on the
back of US aid to South Vietnam and the rise of a consumer society.
In the early 1970s, a number of news media and financial institutions sought to calibrate
the impact of the American war in Vietnam on the Japanese economy. The issue was also
tracked by foreign embassies in Tokyo. According to Richard Broinowski of the Australian
Embassy, the US had been increasing its purchases of Japanese goods and services and
provided a much-needed stimulus to the economy at a time when attempts had been made to
overcome the active effects of the recession. He also noted increased trade with Taiwan,
South Korea, and the Philippines, whose industry required increased Japanese semi-
processed materials. There were also increasing numbers of contracts in Japanese wor-
kshops to repair US aircraft and ships damaged in Vietnam (NAA A1838 759/3/2 Part I
Japan-Economic Relations and Vietnam, Australian Embassy, Tokyo，130/14/1Memo 688，
“Effect of the Vietnam War on the Japanese Economy,”R. Broinowski，3rd secretary，
30 August 1966)．
As Shiraishi (2002: 31-3) confirms, American special procurements in Japan in the 1960s
were not as decisive for the Japanese economy as those during the Korean War given that
the Japanese economy had expanded greatly. Japan's main economic profits from the Viet-
nam war came indirectly. It was above all the influx of US money into neighboring countries
from which Japan profited. In the event, Japan did not carry out its 1959 promise of an addi-
tional loan to South Vietnam. Japan did, however, continue to grant loans, provide a
hospital, fund power plant restoration, and build an orphan vocational facility. Slowly,
Japanese aid policy shifted to developmental aid. In war-torn Vietnam, as Shiraishi observes,
Japanese aid was motivated“by political and strategical factors rather than purely economic
reasons.”But the economic reasons were not inconsequential either, as discussed below.
Extent of Offshore Purchases
Japanese military-related sales to the US, by contrast were substantial. According to
MITI, sales reached US$ 50million in the first half of the 1966 fiscal year. According to a
Sanwa Bank survey (13 July)，special procurements by US forces in Japan were $US
330 million in 1965 and would increase to US$ 450 million in 1966．Japanese exports of ra-
dios, cameras, synthetic fibers, fabrics, and watches in January-March 1966 were over US$
60million (4.4 times higher than for the same period in 1965)．Exports to the US of materi-
als directly related to the manufacture of war equipment were then estimated at nearly US$
300 million per annum. Exports to Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea, were ex-
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pected to show an annual increase from US$ 100million each, based on the demand in each
country for materials needed for their own manufacture of military goods to be procured by
the US for use in Vietnam (Ibid,).
The Sanwa Bank report documented the fact that the Vietnam War played a smaller role
in Japanese exports than had the Korean War. Figures cited indicated that 8 percent of
Japan's total exports were attributable to the Vietnam War, compared to 36 percent attribut-
able to the Korean War. Accordingly, the en of the Vietnam War would not be so damaging
[to the Japanese economy] and losses could be overcome by diversifying exports. Even if
the percentage of Vietnam war procurements by the US in Japan was less than that of the
Korean War as a proportion of total Japanese exports, the monetary value was roughly com-
parable, and stood to increase quickly. The report added that if the war ended tomorrow,
Japanese medium and small enterprises would be hit severely, and many smaller companies
would become bankrupt. Leaders of businesses directly involved in providing war materials
such as explosive components would undoubtedly be wary of incurring the disfavor of the
public deemed mainly against US bombing in north Vietnam (Ibid,).
Notably, as the JSP argued, by allowing private firms to trade in war equipment and serv-
ices, the government was indirectly aiding the US war effort. One example of this was the
repair of carrier-based military aircraft in Japan after being damaged in bombing north Viet-
nam. The government's reply was that it had nothing to do with the private repair business.
Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburo once compared damaged aircraft to US wounded soldi-
ers who were treated in US hospitals in Japan. Both were invalids, he stated, and both were
entitled to private treatment. As Broinowski noted, this could become an issue in future elec-
tions (Ibid,).
Japanese industrial and trading companies doing business with the US Army Procurement
Agency (APA) in Yokohama believed that US purchases for Vietnam had entered an im-
portant new phase and would shift from the original heavy orders emergency machinery and
civilian supply items to products intended for economic construction. Notably, munitions
supply and consumer goods such as cameras and radios had been expanding to heavy indus-
trial goods such as diesel engines and railway wagons as a prelude to another round of
buying in Japan (Takita, Far Eastern Economic Review，19 Jan．1967).
According to Faure and Schwab (2008: 45-7)，profits to Japanese companies profiting
from the Vietnam War were averaging one billion dollars in sales per annum between 1966-
1971．Although there is reason to doubt the accuracy of these figures, at least several billion
dollars were paid to Japanese corporations and suppliers for goods and services contracted
by the US forces，“a bonanza for Japan.”As Faure and Schwab (2008: 46) point out, stu-
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dies undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MITI, the Sanwa Bank and a report by
Nomura Research Institute, showed that exports to the United States and to Southeast Asia
resulted in higher profits for the national economy than the direct impact of the war. Nota-
bly, war orders did not exceed 7 to 8 percent of total Japanese exports, against 63 percent
during the Korean War. Nevertheless, this relatively small figure was sufficient to help ease
the economy out of a slight depression．“Paradoxically,”they write，“the most significant
long-term consequence was Japan's replacement of the United States, as the main economic
partners to the Southeast Asian countries.”This leads the authors to conclude that the big
winner of the Vietnam conflict was Japan.
Conclusion
As this article has demonstrated, the big losers in the Franco-Japanese reparation contest
were the Vietnamese people. Of course, nothing could compensate them for the human loss-
es arising as a result of Japanese and French policies during the Great Famine that struck
Vietnam in 1945 (The famine never entered into reparation discussions) (See Gunn 2011)．
The Kishi-Diem Communique and Japan's war reparation agreement with the Republic of
Vietnam was a deliberate political snub to North Vietnam (and the political opposition in
Japan made it clear at the time)．With the lion's share of Japanese war reparations chan-
neled into the construction of a single project, Diem's Da Nhim Dam, the Viet Cong destruc-
tion of the dam made the point that this was not a project that met with popular approval. In
any case, the dam project fell into the pattern of Japanese reparation payments favoring big
projects of which the chief beneficiaries were Japanese consultants and Japanese construc-
tion companies, with local elites also sharing the benefits. As it transpired, the Paris govern-
ment would not redeem a single centime from Special Yen credits extracted from Indochina.
But with the war in Vietnam taking on the dimensions of an international struggle that saw
North Vietnam backed by, variously, China and the Soviet Union, France needed US as-
sistance. And, as the US had already initiated its“reverse course”in Japan, France was ob-
liged to follow suit. Let off the hook, as it were, we have seen how Japanese business
prospered in the“Vietnam War”boom years. Advised by Ladejinsky, Diem also drove a
hard bargain in negotiating with Japan, at least on behalf of his narrow elite interests. Still,
we wonder why Diem, who stubbornly resisted land reform, opted for a big dam. We can
also concur with Shiraishi (1990)－backhandedly confirming Diem's earlier objections－that
reparations paved the way for entry of Japanese business into Southeast Asia, allowing them
to far outstrip prewar activities. Few who would observe the apparently unproblematic na-
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ture of post-war French-Japanese relations from nuclear cooperation to“cultural”tourism
would have an inkling of the intense and justified angst felt by Paris in the 1945-1954 period
over the compensation/reparations issue. And who, for that matter, could have imagined the
depth of cooperation evinced today between Tokyo and Hanoi, literally from“cultural”
tourism to post-Fukushima nuclear cooperation with Japan discussing provision of nuclear
power plants for Vietnam.
As John Dower (1975: 87-8) ruminated in the closing days of the Vietnam War, there
were also many levels of comparison between America's actions and those of Japan in Viet-
nam prior to 1945．Notably, he found a large discrepancy between both Japan's and
America's rhetoric and reality as with the slogans of liberation, self-determination, and“co-
prosperity.”The catalog of American crimes against humanity in Vietnam also recalled the
charges leveled against the Japanese several years earlier. As with Japan in China, so
America in Vietnam had“grossly misperceived the limits of technology when confronted
with the concerted will of nationalistic resistance,”exacting an enormous price on the
Chinese and Vietnamese people respectively, but being unable to translate technological su-
periority into military victory. Moreover, both countries had become trapped into escalation,
as with the creation of“buffers”or“dominoes.”Both nations fabricated military“inci-
dents”as pretexts for aggression while also entering negotiations as a cover for escalation.
Both stood for regional integration. Tactically as well, there were similarities as with bomb-
ing civilians, the use of biological warfare, abuse of prisoners，“pacification,”and other
egregious activities. Where Japan left off in its unfinished campaigns against communism in
China, Indochina and Korea, America took over. Yet, he explains, policy making elites in
both countries were not irrational－Japanese planning documents were similar in tone and
thrust to those of the Pentagon Papers－rather, in their different ways, both were blighted
by“pathologies” (illusions) of growth and battlefield realism. Neither, we may add, did
France come out clean－or unscarred－from its colonial wars, not only in Vietnam but, tragi-
cally, in Algeria leading to the collapse of the Fourth French Republic in 1962.
Notes
The author wishes to thank Mark Selden for a critical reading of this article.
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